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CORPORATE TAX AVOIDANCE: ADDRESSING THE MERITS
OF PREVENTING MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS FROM
ENGAGING IN THE PRACTICE AND REPATRIATING
OVERSEAS PROFITS
By Alexander J Morgenstern*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Even before the United States gained its independence from Great Britain, taxation
was an issue at the forefront of the minds of many Americans.' The American Revolutionary
War began because of growing tensions between residents of Great Britain's 13 North
American colonies and the colonial government, which represented the British crown. 2 In
fact, for more than a decade before the outbreak of the American Revolution in 1775, tensions
had been building between colonists and the British authorities concerning attempts by the
British government to raise revenue by taxing the colonies.3 These attempts by the British
crown to collect tax were met with zealous protest by many colonists because they resented
their lack of representation in Parliament and demanded the same rights as other British
subjects.4 Although the United States was eventually able to gain its independence from Great
Britain,' one thing the United States has not been able to gain independence from are issues
6
concerning taxation.
Throughout American history, there have always been issues with interpreting and
executing the tax code.' The tax code can be notoriously complex and requires diligent
attention to detail as well as legal and judicial interpretation Judge Learned Hand once said,

*J.D. Candidate, Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University, 2018. I would like to thank my family
for all the encouragement they provided me during the writing and publication process. In addition, it would be
remiss of me to not mention my wonderful girlfriend, Meagan, who has supported me from the beginning.
' American Revolution History, THE HISTORY CHANNEL, http://www.history.com/topics/americanrevolution/american-revolution-history (last visited Feb. 1, 2017).
2 Id.

See id. (discussing how the colonists took issue with a number of taxes imposed upon them by the British.
The most notable of these taxes were: the Stamp Act of 1765, which imposed a tax on all paper documents in
the original thirteen colonies; the Townshend Tariffs of 1767, which imposed a tax on glass, lead, paints, paper,
and tea that were exported from Britain to the colonies; and the Tea Act of 1773, which imposed a harsh duty
on tea being imported to the colonies).
4 See id.; see also "No Taxation Without Representation," THE STAMP ACT, http://www.stamp-acthistory.com/headline/no-taxation-without-representation-2 (last visited Feb. 1, 2017).
s See THE STAMP ACT, supra note 4.
6 Aaron Krupkin & William G. Gale, Major tax issues in 2017, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Sept. 29, 2016),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/major-tax-issues-in-2016-2.
7 Brian Roach, Taxes in the United States: History, Fairness, and Current PoliticalIssues, GLOBAL DEv. AND
ENV'T INST., http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/educationmaterials/modules/Taxesin_the_UnitedStates.pdf (last
visited May 13, 2017).
See generally Mary L. Heen, Plain Meaning, the Tax Code, and DoctrinalIncoherence, 48 HASTINGS L.J.
771 (1997). See also Chris Edwards, Our Complex Tax Code is Crippling America, TIME (Apr. 11, 2016),
http://time.com/4286921/complex-tax-code.
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"any one may arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to
choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to
increase one's taxes." 9
For more than two decades, the United States Treasury Department and the
0
international community have been concerned with multinational corporations' ("MNC")'
engagement in tax avoidance practices to mitigate their tax liabilities due to their respective
nations." Tax avoidance, and the mechanisms that operate as a means to a lower tax or a tax2
free end, are normalized processes in contemporary business.' Corporate leaders have even
3
expressed encouragement of these practices.1 Many corporate executives justify corporate
14
participation in tax avoidance as being "capitalistic" or encompassed in their fiduciary
duties owed to shareholders." However, these views seriously neglect the negative collateral
effects that are imposed on governments and their citizens from the loss of revenue that
16
National tax policies have created a
results from decreased tax collection from MNCs.
dilemma where, on the one hand, national tax policies are needed to foster tax system
competition that keeps the global tax rate low. 1 On the other hand, this competition allows
8
MNCs the freedom to shop around different countries for a tax rate that is desirable.1
The purpose of this Note is to analyze corporate tax principles; the methods by
which MNCs have achieved their tax goals; how tax avoidance by United States-based MNCs

' Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934) (discussing many aspects of the U.S. tax code and
why Americans take action to subvert it, despite legislative intent aimed at the contrary).
1o See,
e.g.,
Multinational
Corporation
(MNC),
ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/multinational-corporation (last visited Nov. 17, 2016) (defining a MNC as
"[a] corporation that is registered and operates in more than one country at a time . . . and that has its
headquarters in one country and operates wholly or partially owned subsidiaries in other countries");
Multinational

Corporation,

INVESTOPEDIA,

http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/multinationalcorporation.asp (last visited Nov. 17, 2016) (stating that
"[a] multinational corporation has facilities and other assets in at least one country other than its home country.
Such companies have offices and/or factories in different countries and usually have a centralized head office
where they coordinate global management. Very large multinationals have budgets that exceed those of many
small countries").
11 U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S RECENT STATE AID INVESTIGATIONS OF
(Aug. 24, 2016), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/taxRULINGS
PRICING
TRANSFER
policy/treaties/Documents/White-Paper-State-Aid.pdf
12 See Lee Simmons, Why Corporate Tax Avoidance is Bigger Than You Think, GRADUATE SCHOOL OF
STANFORD BUSINESS (May 24, 2016), https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/insights/why-corporate-tax-shiftingbigger-you-think (stating that many MNCs that face inconsistent tax rates and rules around the world, structure
their operations in ways that channel earnings out of high-tax countries where the value is created).
'3

Google's Tax Avoidance Is Called "Capitalism,"Says Chairman Eric Schmidt, The TELEGRAPH (Dec. 12,

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/google/9739039/Googles-tax-avoidance-is-called-capitalism2012),
says-chairman-Eric-Schmidt.html.
14 See id. ("I am very proud of the structure that we set up. We did it based on the incentives that the
governments offered us to operate. It's called capitalism.").
" Jasmine M. Fisher, Fairer Shores: Tax Havens, Tax Avoidance, and CorporateSocial Responsibility, 94

B.U.L. Rev. 337, 338 (2014).
16 See infra, Part III.A.
17

See Buttonwood, Internationaltax avoidance: Simple, independent and multination; another trilemma, THE

ECONOMIST

(Apr. 6, 2016, 19:28), http://www.economist.com/blogs/buttonwood/2016/04/international-tax-

avoidance.
'

See id.
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harm the United States; the affect that Donald Trump's presidency will have on tax
avoidance; and possibilities for incentivizing or forcing MNCs to discontinue and disavow tax
avoidance. Part II of this Note addresses current corporate income tax law in the United
States.19 Additionally, it describes and defines what tax avoidance is compared with tax
evasion, and how the scope of tax avoidance has grown exponentially.20 Further, Part II
discusses the methods that MNCs utilize to avoid taxes and examples of corporations that
engage in the practice.2 1 Part III of this Note addresses the negative effects on average
Americans that result from MNCs engagement in tax avoidance. 22 In addition, Part III delves
into government actions that have already been taken in order to prevent MNCs from
continuing their harmful tax conduct." Part III of this Note specifically discusses Donald
Trump's presidency and how his proposed policies will potentially affect the overall issue of
tax avoidance in the United States. 24 In Part IV of this Note, solutions are posed to address tax
avoidance on a macro level. 25
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

Corporate Income Tax Law in the United States

The Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") is a bureau of the United States Treasury
Department26 and was created pursuant to section 7801 of the Internal Revenue Code
("IRC"), which authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to create an agency to enforce the
IRC. 27 As a result of this legislative grant of authority, the IRS was created 28 along with an
appointed commissioner to head the agency. 29 As the revenue collector of the United States,
the IRS administers the federal statutory tax law (i.e. the IRC) and collects taxes-one of
which being income tax.3 0 Many people think that income tax is garnered solely from the
paychecks of American citizens, but income tax is not only collected from individuals' annual

'9 See infra Part II.A.
20 See infra Part
II.B.
2 See infra Part II.C.
22 See infra Part III.A.
" See infra Part III.B.
24 See infra Part IIC.
25 See infra Part IV.
26 The Agency,
its Mission and Statutory Authority, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (July 27, 2016),
https://www.irs.gov/uac/the-agency-its-mission-and-statutory-authority.
" 26 U.S.C. § 7801 (2016).
28 See id. (providing further statutory context for the establishment of the Internal Revenue
Service).
29 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 26; see also 26 U.S.C. § 7803 (2016) (providing
statutory
authority for the appointment of a commissioner to supervise the administration of the internal revenue laws).
30 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 26; see also Corporations,INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (July 8,

2016), https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/corporations
corporations that are subject to collection by the IRS).

(discussing the taxes of
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income. 3 1 Corporations in the United States are also subject to income tax on their profits,
32
pursuant to section -11 of the IRC.
Corporate income taxation poses two questions: (1) what is a corporation and (2)
are
the
tax burdens that United States-based corporations are subject to? With regard to
what
the first question, a corporation is an entity that "conducts business, realizes net income or
loss, pays taxes and distributes profits to shareholders." 3 3 As it relates to the second question,
section 11 (b)(1) of the IRC defines the amount of tax to be imposed as a percentage of the
34
sum of taxable income based on how much income the corporation generates each year. In
other words, a corporation's income tax rate is subject to change depending on how much
35
income the corporation generated for that tax year. Corporations that are the most profitable
are faced with higher tax burdens on their income, whereas those that are less lucrative
36
benefit from the tax code by not contributing as much of a share to the tax revenue pool.
Section 11 of the IRC provides the following tax rates for corporations: (1) a
corporation will be taxed 15 percent of its income if that income does not exceed $50,000,3"
(2) a corporation that generates income of between $50,000 and $75,000 will be taxed at 25
percent,3 8 (3) a corporation that generates income of between $75,000 and $10,000,000 will
be taxed at 34 percent, 3 9 and (4) a corporation that generates income in excess of $10,000,000
will be taxed at 35 percent. 40
A corporation satisfies its income tax obligation by filing a U.S. Corporation Income
Tax Return (Form 1120),41 in which the corporation reports its income, gains, losses,
deductions, and credits. 42 With those figures, the corporation can compute its income tax
liability using the prescribed formula that is found on Form 1120.43 After Form 1120 is filed
with the IRS, the corporation has until the fifteenth day of the third month after the end of its

31 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUBLICATION

17, YOUR FEDERAL INCOME TAX: FOR INDIVIDUALS (2015)
17"].
[hereinafter "PUBLICATION
32 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERv., supra note 30; 26 U.S.C. § 11(a) (2016) ("Corporations in general. A tax is
hereby imposed for each taxable year on the taxable income of every corporation.").
3 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 30.
3 26 U.S.C. § 11(b)(1) (2016).
See Douglas McIntyre, Companies paying the most in income taxes, USA TODAY (Mar. 17, 2013),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/personalfinance/2013/03/17/companies-paying-highest-incometaxes/1991313 (describing how companies paying the most in taxes tend to fall into only a few categories: the
first is huge oil companies; second are the large tech companies, particularly those that have been around for
some time such as Microsoft (MSFT); and the third are banking institutions, as many have made huge profits
from trading and investment banking operations).
3 26 U.S.C. § 11(b)(1)(A) (2016).
3 26 U.S.C. § 11(b)(1)(B) (2016).
* 26 U.S.C. § 1 1(b)(1)(C) (2016).
40 26 U.S.C. § 11(b)(1)(D) (2016).
41 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUBLICATION 542, CORPORATIONS (2012) [hereinafter "PUBLICATION
542"]; INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FORM 1120, U.S. CORPORATION INCOME TAX RETURN (2012) [hereinafter
"FORM 1120"].
42 See FORM 1120, supra note 41; PUBLICATION 542, supra note 41.
" See FORM 1120, supra note 41; PUBLICATION 542, supranote 41.
36
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tax year to pay its income tax in full. 4 4 For example, if a corporation's tax year ends on
November 3 1 ', it must file its income tax return by February 15th 45
In 2016, Kyle Pomerleau and Emily Potosky conducted a study on behalf of the Tax
Foundation. 4 6 This study examined the top marginal corporate income tax rates among 188
different nations, including the United States, India, Brazil, and France.
The study found
that the United States-with a top combined corporate income tax rate of 39 percent48-has
the third highest corporate income tax rate in the world, only behind the United Arab
Emirates and Puerto Rico. 4 9 To put into perspective just how high the U.S. corporate tax rate
is, consider the fact that the average tax rate across all of the 188 countries sampled was only
22.5 percent. Over the past 14 years, the worldwide average corporate tax rate fell by
approximately seven percent-from a rate of 30 percent in 2003 to the current abovementioned average for 2016 (22.5%).s1 These figures are troubling for the United States
because a nation's corporate tax rate is one of the many factors that are analyzed when
assessing whether to invest in that nation's economy.5 2 Accordingly, if the United States
retains such a high corporate tax rate while the rest of the world lowers theirs, the United
States risks becoming uncompetitive and unattractive to foreign investment. 53
B.

What Tax Avoidance Is and What It Is Not

The terms "tax evasion" and "tax avoidance" are often used interchangeably, though
mistakenly, to refer to any practice of reducing tax payments;5 4 however, tax evasion is not
the same as tax avoidance. 55 Tax evasion pertains to illegally reducing tax payments through

See PUBLICATION 542, supra note 41.
See id.
46 The Tax Foundation is the one of the leading independent tax policy
research organizations in the United
States. Kyle Pomerleau & Emily Potosky, Corporate Income Tax Rates around the World 2016, TAX
FOUNDATION
(Aug.
2016),
http://taxfoundation.org/sites/taxfoundation.org/files/docs/TaxFoundationFF525.pdf.
4
4

47

id.

Because the United States has separate state and federal corporate income tax rates, the study utilized "a
combined . . . tax rate . . . [ ]consisting of the federal tax rate of thirty-five percent plus the average tax rate
among the states." Id.
4 Id. (noting that Puerto Rico's corporate income tax rate is thirty-nine percent, only one tenth of a percent
higher than the United States; the United Arab Emirates has set their corporate income tax rate at fifty-five
percent).
50 Id.
48

s' Id

Id See also Factors Influencing Foreign Investment Decisions, THE LEVIN INSTITUTE,
http://www.globalizationlOl.org/factors-influencing-foreign-investment-decisions (last visited Nov. 18, 2016)
(stating that the main factors that foreign investors consider include: the rules and regulations pertaining to the
entry and operations of foreign investors; standards of treatment of foreign affiliates, compared to "nationals"
of the host country; the functioning and efficiency of local markets; trade policy and privatization policy;
business facilitation measures, such as investment promotion, incentives, improvements in amenities and other
measures to reduce the cost of doing business; restrictions, if any, on repatriating earnings or profits in the form
of dividends, royalties, interest or other payments).
s5 See Pomerleau & Potosky, supra note 46.
s See Fisher, supranote 15, at 339.
" See Joshua D. Blank & Nancy Staudt, CorporateShams, 87 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1641, 1645 (2012).
52
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56
conduct that usually involves "deception, concealment, or destruction of records", whereas
tax avoidance pertains to legally reducing tax payments through strategic conduct that the
57
taxpayer is willing to disclose to the IRS. To illustrate the difference between tax evasion
and tax avoidance, consider the following simplified examples: a MNC engages in tax
evasion by underreporting its income (an illegal activity), whereas a MNC engages in tax
avoidance by paying income tax on profits in a country with lower taxes than their country of
origin (a legal activity)."
There are a numerous reasons why MNCs choose to engage in tax avoidance
practices. ' Some MNCs that engage in tax avoidance are attempting to pay less in income
tax than is required by a country's laws. 6o Additionally, through tax avoidance practices,
MNCs will pay income tax on profits earned in a country with a more favorable corporate tax
61
Or, in some cases, MNCs choose to engage in such tax practices in order to pay
rate.
income tax later than when the profits were earned, so MNCs can deflate the amount of
profit. Now that the distinction is clear, think of tax avoidance as existing in "the gray area
between tax compliance and tax evasion."
The scale of ax avoidance is well described by Gabriel Zucman, a Berkeley
economist, who notes that "[albout fifty-five percent of all the foreign profits of [MNCs]
based in the United States are artificially booked to countries that tax [income] at zero or
close to zero."" This diversion of tax revenue away from our national tax system is nothing
new. In 1952, corporate income tax revenue accounted for 32 percent of all federal revenue,
whereas in 2009, corporate income tax revenue accounted for only about nine percent of all
66
federal revenue. Moreover, as of 2015, MNCs based in the United States are estimated to
have as much as $2.1 trillion in profits stored outside the United States for tax avoidance

56 See Fisher, supra note 15, at 340 (2014) (emphasis added); see also Tax Evasion,
INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/taxevasion.asp (last visited Jan. 9, 2017) (defining tax evasion as "an
illegal practice where a person, organization or corporation intentionally avoids paying his true tax liability and
applies to both the illegal nonpayment, as well as the illegal underpayment of taxes"); see generally 26 U.S.C. §
7201 (2016) (providing statutory context for tax evasion).
5 See Fisher, supra note 15, at 340 (emphasis added); see also Tax Avoidance, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/tax-avoidance.asp (last visited Jan. 9, 2017) (defining tax avoidance as
"the use of legal methods to modify an individual's [or a corporation's] financial situation to lower the amount
of income tax owed").
5 See INVESTOPEDIA, supra note 57.

5 See Fisher, supranote 15, at 340.
6o See id.
61 See id.

62 See Fisher, supra note 15, at 340.
63 See Fisher, supra note 15, at 339
n.9.
64 Arthur Goldhammer, Bad Apple: Cracking Down on Corporate Tax-Avoidance Schemes, THE NATION, NOV.
2016, at 6, 6.
65 See Corporate tax avoidance by multinationalfirms, Library Briefing, EUR. PARL. Doc. 1305574REV1
(2013).
66 Press Release, U.S. Senate Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, Subcommittee Hearing to Examine
Billions of Dollars in U.S. Tax Avoidance by Multinational Corporations (Sept. 20, 2012),
https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/media/subcommittee-hearing-to-examinebillionsof-dollars-in-us-tax-avoidance-by-multinational-corporations.
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purposes.6 ' These figures are problematic for the United States because, amongst other
reasons, our taxes are levied in order to fund public spending. 8 Corporate income taxes are a
major source of that funding," and without it, revenue to fund spending must be found
elsewhere.7 0 As a result, the tax burden in the United States is being negatively skewed,
where American families are bearing a much larger share of the tax burden than United
States-based MNCs. 7 ' To illustrate the point, consider the following: in 1952, when
corporations' income tax constituted 32 percent of federal revenue, individual income tax
accounted for about 42 percent of federal revenue.7 2 In 2015, while corporations' income tax
decreased to only about 11 percent (a 21 percent decline), individual payroll taxes increased
to 47 percent of all federal revenue. In addition, in 1952 payroll taxes from individual
Americans constituted about 32 percent of federal revenue, while in 2015 payroll taxes
declined to about 11 percent of federal revenue (a twenty-one percent decline). 7 Even after
more than 60 years, the clear imbalance that tax avoidance has created on the backs of
American taxpayers is not resolved.
C.

Methods That MNCs Utilize to Avoid and Reduce Taxes

Steve Forbes, the Editor-in-Chief of Forbes business magazine, 7 expressed his
feelings towards the United States tax code, stating that: "[t]he tax code is a monstrosity and
there's only one thing to do with it. Scrap it, kill it, drive a stake through its heart, bury it and
hope it never rises again to terrorize the American people."7 6 It is language such as this that
reflects the widespread negativity towards the tax code, which MNCs have seized and utilized
to prop up and contribute to the culture of contemporary tax avoidance. All methods that
MNCs utilize have one thing in common: the shifting of income from a country with a higher
tax rate to a county with a lower rate or no tax rate at all. 7 ' Typically, this involves the use of
tax havens, which are specific jurisdictions wherein extremely low tax rates and banking
secrecy laws exist.7 Some common methods of tax avoidance fueled by the use of tax havens
Richard Rubin, US. Companies Are Stashing $2.1 Trillion Overseas to Avoid Taxes, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 4,
2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201 5-03-04/u-s-companies-are-stashing-2-1 -trillion-overseasto-avoid-taxes (noting that corporate giants such as Microsoft Corp., Apple Inc., Google Inc. and five other tech
firms account for more than a fifth of the $2.10 trillion in profits that U.S. companies are holding overseas).
68 See EUR. PARL. Doc. 1305574REV1, supra note 65.
69 See EUR. PARL. Doc. 1305574REV1, supra
note 65.
70 Such as: individual income tax, payroll taxes, excise
taxes, and customs and duties.
1 See Press Release, supranote 66.
72 1952
United States Budget vs. 2015 United States Budget, INSIDE Gov., http://federalbudget.insidegov.com/compare/54-118/1952-vs-2015 (last visited Nov. 19, 2016).
67

73

id.

id.
7 See Forbes, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forbes (last visited Jan. 31, 2017); see also Steve
ForbesBiography, BIOGRAPHY.COM (Apr. 2, 2014), http://www.biography.com/people/steve-forbes-37588.
74

76

See SHELDON D. POLLACK, REFINANCING AMERICA: THE REPUBLICAN ANTITAX AGENDA 71 (2003).

See generally Steven Forbes, Fact and Comment, FORBES (June 6, 2005, 12:00 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/freeforbes/2005/0606/031.html.
78 See EUR. PARL. Doc. 1305574REVl, supranote 65.
7 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., Abusive Offshore Tax Avoidance Schemes, (Aug. 9, 2016),
https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/abusive-offshore-tax-avoidance-schemes7

339

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2017

7

Journal of International Business and Law, Vol. 16, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 12
THE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BusINEss & LAW

include: (1) inversions;80 (2) profit-shifting strategies; (3) transfer pricing; (4) payments for
intangibles; (5) shell holding companies; (6) hybrid entities; and (7) company-specific tax
rulings."
An inversion typically occurs when a MNC based in the United States acquires a
smaller company based in a foreign country-usually a country with a low tax rate-and then
relocates the residence of the combined company in the low tax country to limit tax
obligations.8 2 Profit-shifting involves a MNC limiting its operational activities in a country
with higher taxes by moving the activities to a subsidiary of the MNC located in a country
with lower taxes." The MNC's profits from those same activities are then taxed based on the
lower tax country's rate, thereby reducing or even eliminating the MNC's tax obligation.84
Transfer pricing is more complicated; it involves the setting of prices for transactions between
entities that are all part of the same MNC. 8 ' These transactions can involve physical goods,
but it is more common now for them to involve the right to use certain intangible goods and
services.8 6 The majority of transactions are "inter-company" transactions that ignore the
88
"arms-length principle," 8 7 which MNCs are supposed to abide by. Instead, MNCs will
artificially inflate or deflate the price of a transaction in order to pay the least amount of tax
and gain the most profit.89
Another method involves MNCs payments to entities within the MNC for intangible
goods and/or services.90 A MNC will create an entity in a lower tax area that has intellectual
property ownership rights over intangibles, and will then charge another entity in a higher tax
91
area for use of those intangibles, for example, a licensing fee. This allows a INC to have an

talking-points; see also Tax Haven, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining a tax haven as "[a]
jurisdiction, esp. a country, that imposes little or no tax on the profits from transactions carried on there or on
persons resident there. Black's explains further that "[a]mong the reasons for this complexity [in international
taxation] is the elusive nature of tax havens. A tax haven is not always immediately obvious. What makes a
particular environment a tax haven is not invariably a low rate of tax, but relations with other tax regimes that
permit the ultimate deflection of income to a low-tax environment with which the income may have little
indigenous connection").
'0 See Jeanne Sahadi, Obama: Corporatetax avoidance hurts the middle class, CABLE NEWS NETWORK (April
5, 2016), http://money.cnn.com/2016/04/05/news/economy/obama-tax-inversion.
" See EUR. PARL. Doc. 1305574REV1, supra note 65.; see also INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 79
(discussing the same and other methods for tax avoidance, including the use of tax havens); see also Robert A.
Green, The Future of Source-Based Taxation of The Income of MultinationalEnterprises, 79 CORNELL L. REV.
18 (1993) (providing more information on the "nuts-and-bolts" of transfer pricing).
82 See Seth Hanlon, The Corporate Inversions Tax Loophole: What You Need To Know, THE WHITE HOUSE
(April 8, 2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2016/04/08/corporate-inversions-tax-loophole-what-youneed-know; see also Sahadi, supranote 80.
8 See EUR. PARL. DOC. 1305574REVI, supra note 65.
84 See EUR. PARL. Doc. 1305574REV1, supra
note 65.
85 See EuR. PARL. Doc. 1305574REV1, supranote 65.
86 See Green, supranote
81.
87 "The 'arms-length principle' requires MNCs with subsidiaries in more than one country to value transactions
as if they had been carried out by unrelated parties, each acting in his own best interest." Fisher, supranote 15,
at 340.
'8 See EuR. PARL. Doc. 1305574REVl, supra note 65.
89 See Fisher, supra note 15, at 340.
90 See EUR. PARL. Doc. 1305574REV1, supra note 65.
9 See EUR. PARL. Doc. 1305574REV1, supra note 65.
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entity that owns its intellectual property in a country where no taxes are payable on license
fees, and then charge its internationally affiliated enterprises to use them. 9 2 The effect is taxfree profit for the sale of intangible goods/services used. 9 3 Another important vehicle used by
MNCs are shell holding companies, which are found in jurisdictions that offer low tax rates
and have secrecy laws that are beneficial to the MNC.94 Typically, a "shell" company is one
that is not engaged in real production, trading, or distribution activities;9 ' rather, the company
is used merely as a holding company to effectuate tax planning goals in multiple ways.9 6
Hybrid entities are mechanisms that occur in counties that allow dual-residence
companies, such as Ireland. 9 7 Ireland has companies that are headquartered in Ireland, but for
tax purposes, are legally based in another country-typically a tax haven-such as the
Netherlands or Bermuda.9' One of the ingenious methods that has risen as a result of hybrid
entities is the "Double Irish Dutch Sandwich," 99 which will be discussed below. Lastly,
company-specific tax rulings provide for the direct negotiation of a tax rate between a MNC
and the country that constitutes the tax authority.'o This has become a sensitive issue,
particularly within the European Union, as special tax treatment for individual companies is
viewed as undermining competition for foreign investment among member states.101
1.

Google's "Double IrishDutch Sandwich"
Google, a massive MNC based in the United States, who's parent company's 02
motto paradoxically reads "Do the right thing," 0 3 is one of the major players in the realm of
corporate tax avoidance.104 The company argues that it is simply exploiting legal means and
the loopholes in the tax code to maximize shareholder profits, but the reality is that Google is
minimizing its obligations to the countries from which it derives its earnings. 1o Investigators
and journalists who have studied the way Google handles its profits have dubbed the strategy
See EuR. PARL. Doc. 1305574REVl, supranote 65.
See EUR. PARL. Doc. 1305574REV1, supra note 65.
94 See EuR. PARL. DOc. 1305574REV1, supra note 65.
9 See Jim Zarroli, Want to Setup a Shell Corporation to Hide Your Millions? No Problem, NATIONAL PUBLIC
RADIO (Apr. 13, 2016), http://www.npr.org/2016/04/13/474101127/want-to-set-up-a-shell-corporation-to-hideyour-millions-no-problem.
96 See EuR. PARL. Doc. 1305574REVl, supra note 65.
97 See EuR. PARL. Doc. 1305574REV1, supra note 65.
98 See EuR. PARL. DOc. 1305574REV1, supra note 65.
9 See EuR. PARL. Doc. 1305574REVl, supra note 65; see also Goldhammer, supra note 64 at 6 (discussing
Google's engagement in the tax avoidance practice known as the "Double Irish Dutch sandwich).
100 See EuR. PARL. DOc. 1305574REV1, supra note 65.
'1 See European Commission Press Release IP/16/2923, State Aid: Ireland Gave Illegal Tax Benefits to Apple
Worth Up to 13 Billion Euros (Aug. 30, 2016) (discussing how Member States cannot give tax benefits to
selected companies as it is illegal under EU state aid rules. Member States have already agreed to tackle the
most prevalent loopholes in national laws that allow tax avoidance to take place and to extend their automatic
exchange of information to country-by-country reporting of tax-related financial information of multinationals).
'02 Larry Page, G is for Google, ALPHABET https://abc.xyz/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2017) (discussing how
Alphabet is mostly a collection of companies, the largest of which is Google).
103 See Allistar Barr, Google 's 'Don't Be Evil' Becomes Alphabets 'Do the Right Thing', WALL ST. J. (Oct. 2,
2015), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2015/10/02/as-google-becomes-alphabet-dont-be-evil-vanishes.
104 See generally Goldhammer, supra note 64 at 6; see also Julia Mead, How to Make a Double
Irish Dutch
Sandwich, THE NATION, Nov. 2016, at 8, 8.
'os Goldhammer, supra note 64, at 8.
92

9
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06
as the "Double Irish Dutch Sandwich."' Here is how it works: before going public in 2004,
Google U.S. transferred part of its "intangible capital" (search and advertising technologies)
07
to Google Holdings, a subsidiary headquartered in Ireland.1 Google Holdings then created
another Irish subsidiary, Ireland Limited, which for Irish tax reasons technically resides in
Bermuda, where its "mind and management" are supposedly located.'o Ireland Limited then
licenses Google's intangible capital to affiliates in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East (e.g.
Google France pays royalties to Ireland Limited in order to use Google's intangible
capital). 09 Ireland Limited then takes the profits from these royalty payments and transfers
them to Google BV, a shell company in the Netherlands."o This transfer is tax free because
both Ireland and the Netherlands are members of the European Union."' Google BV pays all
the earnings back to Ireland Limited, which as previously mentioned, is technically located in
3
Bermuda.11 2 In Bermuda, the corporate tax rate is zero percent." The end result is that
Google's effective tax rate on foreign profits is extremely low, or none at all, because
4
technically Google's foreign profits are taxed in Bermuda.11 How successful has this strategy
been for Google? According to Gabriel Zucman, "[Google's] effective tax rate on foreign
profits has ranged from two to eight percent.""' Additionally, in 2015, Google avoided
paying $3.6 billion in taxes by funneling $15.5 billion in profits to its Bermuda shell
company, Ireland Limited."'

InternationalBusiness Machines
International Business Machines ("IBM") is a United States-based hardware,
software, and services firm that was incorporated in 1911 under the name ComputingTabulating-Recording Company and was later renamed to International Business Machines in
2.

See id.; see also Philip Elmer-DeWitt, Apple's tax strategies: 'Double Irish with a Dutch Sandwich',
FORTUNE (Apr. 29, 2012), http://fortune.com/2012/04/29/apples-tax-strategies-double-irish-with-a-dutchsandwich/ (discussing how companies such as Apple and Amazon employ the same methods as Google to
avoid taxes); Danny Hakim, Europe Takes Aim at Deals Createdto Escape Taxes: The Tax Attraction Between
14,
2014),
THE
NEW
YORK
TIMES
(Nov.
Starbucks
and
the
Netherlands,
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/15/business/intemational/the-tax-attraction-between-starbucks-and-the106

netherlands.html (noting that "the laws in Netherlands shield a variety of profits from taxation, making it
attractive for big multinational companies like Starbucks, Google and IBM to set up offices. Even rock stars
like the Rolling Stones and U2 have taken advantage of Dutch tax shelters").
'o' See Mead, supranote 104.
See id.
1" See id.
110 See id.
" See id.

los

112

See Mead, supranote 104.

" See id; see also Jon Stone, It's our sovereign right to set 0% corporation tax rate, UK-protected tax haven

Bermuda says, INDEPENDENT (Dec. 12, 2016), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/tax-havensbermuda-worst-zero-per-cent-corporation-tax-rate-a7469386.html.
1" See Mead, supranote 104, at 8.
11. Goldhammer, supra note 64, at 8.
"6 Jeremy Khan, Google Lowered 2015 Taxes by $3.6 Billion Using 'Dutch Sandwich', BLOOMBERG (Dec. 21,
2
2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-12-21/google-lowered- 015-taxes-by-3-6-billion-usingdutch-sandwich.
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1924.117 With over 370,000 employees and operations in more than 170 countries,"' IBM is
easily considered one of the major players in the technology industry." 9 Not surprisingly
then, shares of the company trade on the New York Stock Exchange for around $175 each as
of February 2017,
and in 2015, IBM was able to generate approximately $82 billion in
revenue.121
In a perfect world, because IBM makes more than $10 million in income, the
company technically should be subject to the corporate income tax rate of 35 percent that is
set out by our federal tax code. 12 2 In reality, from 2008 through 2012, IBM paid U.S.
corporate income taxes equal to just 5.8 percent of its $45.3 billion in U.S. profits over this
five year period. 12 3 How was IBM able to avoid more than 29 percent of its income tax
obligation in the United States? Through utilizing a tax strategy that sends profits through a
Dutch subsidiary, IBM has been able to cut their tax rate to the lowest it has been in 20
years.124

More specifically, IBM utilizes IBM International Group BV, which was
incorporated in 1999 under Dutch laws that are notorious for their tax favorability. 1 2 1 IBM
International Group BV is a subsidiary of IBM that acts as a holding companyl2 6 for more
than 40 IBM-owned companies worldwide, including its operations in Ireland. 127 As a result,

See generally The Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica, International Business Machines Corporation
(IBM), ENCYLCOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Aug. 18, 2009), https://www.britannica.com/topic/Intemational-BusinessMachines-Corporation.
" Julie Bort, IBM added 70,000 people to its rank in 2015 and lost that many too, BUSINESS INSIDER (Feb. 25,
2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/ibm-added-and-lost-70000-people2016-2; see generally IBM Basics,
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES (2008), http://www.ibm.com/ibm/responsibility/basics.shtml.
"9 See Tim Smith, Global Technology: 4 Key Industry Players (MSFT, IBM), INVESTOPEDIA (Apr. 21, 2016),
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/042116/global-technology-4-key-industry-players-msftibm.asp.
120 About IBM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES, http://www.ibm.com/ibm/us/en/?lnk-fab (last visited
117

Jan. 20, 2017).
121

See id

122

See supra, note 40 'and accompanying text.

IBM Paid 5.8 Percent FederalIncome Tax Rate Over 5 Years, CITIZENS FOR TAX JUSTICE (Feb. 7, 2014,
10:05
AM),
http://ctj.org/ctjreports/2014/02/ibm_paid_58_ercent-federalincometax-rate-over_5_years.php#.WJYThrY
rKYU; see generally Citizens for Tax Justice Staff, IBM's Nonsensical Response to CTJ's Finding that It Paid
5.8
Percent Effective
Federal Tax
Rate,
TAX
JUSTICE
BLOG
(Feb.
11,
2014),
http://www.taxjusticeblog.org/archive/2014/02/ibmsnonsensical-response-to-c.php#.WJYhMLYrKCQ.
124 Alex Barinka & Jesse Drucker, IBM Uses Dutch Tax Haven to Boost Profits as Sales
Slide, BLOOMBERG
TECHNOLOGY (Feb. 4, 2014, 6:38 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-02-03/ibm-uses-dutchtax-haven-to-boost-profits-as-sales-slide.
125 See id; see generally The Netherlands: the undisputed European champion in facilitating corporate tax
avoidance, OXFAM INTERNATIONAL (May 24, 2016), https://www.oxfam.org/en/research/netherlands-tax-haven
(discussing reasons why the Netherlands is used as a tax haven by corporations).
126 See
generally
Holding
Company,
INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/holdingcompany.asp (last visited Jan. 10, 2017) (defining a holding
company as "a parent corporation, limited liability company or limited partnership that owns enough voting
stock in another company to control its policies and management [and also] exists for the . . . purpose of
controlling another company, which might also be a corporation, limited partnership or limited liability
company, rather than for the purpose of producing its own goods or services").
127 See Barinka & Drucker, supra note 124.
123
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IBM funnels its overseas profits through this subsidiary to lower its tax burden on profits
earned overseas, instead of repatriating those profits and being subject to a corporate income
tax of 35 percent in the United States. 12 Additionally, as it relates to profits earned in the
United States, nothing is stopping IBM from shifting those profits to the same Dutch
subsidiary utilizing any of the previously mentioned methods. 129
To put this in perspective, as of year's end in 2012, IBM accumulated $44.4 billion
of offshore profits that it had not paid U.S. taxes on-the sixth-highest total of any American
company. 130 In its business results for the end of 2013, IBM listed its effective tax rate as 15.6
percent worldwide, down from 24.2 percent in 2012.131 IBM said its tax rate was lower than it
had forecast because of a "more favorable expected geographic mix" of revenue, but not
13 2
Ed Outslay, an accounting
surprisingly, the company did not provide any further details.
in other words: "[n]o
conduct
IBM's
explained
University,
State
Michigan
at
professor
1 33
company is better than IBM at managing their annual effective tax rate."
III. ISSUES
A.

Effects of Tax Avoidance on Average American Citizens

One of the main issues with tax avoidance practices is the effect on the United
States economy and American citizens in general. Middle class Americans take an even
harder hit than most because lost tax revenue will have to be generated elsewhere, usually by
34
cutting funding from essential programs.1 In practice, this means that our government will
be unable to spend tax dollars on things such as improving schools, making college more
13 5
Cutting funding
affordable, generating jobs, and rebuilding our national infrastructure.
from investments in the future of the middle class, at the expense of allowing MNCs to utilize
1 36
Obama explained,
loopholes in our tax code, is an issue that President Obama addressed.
"[i]t's perfectly legal. And that's the problem. It's not that they're breaking the laws. It's that
137
the law is poorly designed."
Barack Obama is not alone in his remarks towards MNCs' exploitation of the tax
code and the affect it has on the American public. In fact, this problem has been around for
two decades. In 2002, legislators from Massachusetts and Connecticut proposed the Corporate
Patriot Enforcement Act.1 38 In doing so, the legislators expressed their disgust of the

See Barinka & Drucker, supra note 124; see generally TAX JUSTICE BLOG, supranote 123.
129 See Barinka & Drucker, supra note 124; see generally TAX JUSTICE BLOG, supra note 123.
130 See Barinka & Drucker, supra note 124.
131 Brid-Aine Parnell, IBM nearly HALVES its effective tax rate in 2013: Big Blue reportedly benefits from
2014),
4,
(Feb.
REGISTER
THE
subsidiary,
Dutch
through
profits
shuffling
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/02/04/ibm-taxrate-netherlandssubsidiary.
132 See
id.
128

133 See id.
134

See Sahadi, supranote 80.

13

See id

136 See id
137 See id.

138 Corporate Patriot Enforcement Act, H.R. 3884, 107th Cong. (2002).
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manipulation that occurs at the hands of MNCs to the detriment of average Americans and the
American economy by stating:
Corporate expatriates are former U.S. companies who set up paper
headquarters in tax havens in order to avoid U.S. taxes... . In fact, such
expatriates continue to reside in the United States, take advantage of our
education system, our public utility systems and, of course, our national
defense. In this time of war, they are saying, "Thank you but we aren't
going to pay our fair share." This is outrageous. Congress must act
expeditiously to close this loophole. . . . Speaking of corporate tax
avoidance, try and keep a straight face when you tell your constituents that
it is perfectly legal for a company to rent a post office in Bermuda and
avoid paying taxes. This is utterly ridiculous. One of the effects of
corporations not paying their taxes is that we cannot give seniors and
working families a prescription drug benefit, or that we cannot fund the
President's education bill or hire more cops. Moreover, we are in the
middle of a war, and we are effectively permitting U.S. companies to place
a higher value on earnings than on patriotism. 139
Clearly, the impacts of tax avoidance are widespread and have a trickle-down effect
that touches the majority of American citizens in a negative way. It seems that the only real
winners when it comes to tax avoidance are the MNCs that are paying less to receive the same
benefits.
B.

Government Actions to Curb MNCs Negative Tax Practices

According to Congress' Joint Committee on Taxation, inversions by MNCs will cost
the U.S. Treasury Department approximately $40 billion over the next ten years. 14 0 On April
4, 2016, the United States Treasury Department took action and set out new regulations to
14
combat tax loopholes that allowed corporations to partake in so-called "inversions." 1
Inversions are normally done on paper without the MNC actually moving its operations
overseas.142 Because inversions are in essence a legal fiction, MNCs are able to enjoy the
benefits of being a U.S. company, such as having access to U.S. markets; rule of law; patent
and intellectual property enforcement by the federal government; support for research and
development; and American workers.143 The new Treasury regulations seek to make it more
144
difficult for companies to invert, and to limit the economic benefits of doing such.
The Treasury Department took action pursuant to its existing authority under our
current tax laws to limit corporate inversions in two ways: (1) addressing "serial inverters"
and (2) addressing "earnings stripping" (referred to previously as profit-shifting). 14 5 In a serial
'3
140

148 CONG. REc. H2477.
See Hanlon, supranote 82.

141

See id.

142

See id
See id
See id.

143
144

145

See id.
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inversion, a U.S.-based MNC acquires a foreign MNC that has already been inverted or that
has grown larger by way of U.S. companies' acquisitions. 146 Serial inverters are able to avoid
penalties under existing law if the foreign firm in an inversion transaction is below a certain
47
size compared to the U.S. firm that is acquiring it.1 For example, a U.S. company inverts
overseas by moving its residence to another country for tax purposes by purchasing a smaller
148
Then
foreign firm and then locating the residence of the MNC in the foreign country.
another U.S. MNC engages in an inversion by acquiring the new foreign MNC that was
created in the first transaction. 14 This practice allows one inversion to bring into existence
another inversion, or in other words, one American company can follow another American
company with impunity. "o
So how does the Treasury Department's new regulations prevent this practice? The
new regulations "restrict serial inversions by not counting inversions or foreign acquisitions
of U.S. [MNCs] occurring within the last three years when applying the formula that
determines whether an inversion is subject to penalties or blocked by existing tax code
rules." 15 1 In this way, INCs cannot utilize a recent inversion or a recent foreign acquisition
to enable an inversion and avoid triggering penalties.152
Earnings stripping is a method that foreign MNCs used to avoid paying U.S. taxes
by artificially shifting their profits out of the United States. 1s3 Typically, a foreign MNC will
make a large loan to a U.S. subsidiary for tax purposes, though in actuality, the loan is
completely unnecessary.15 4 Normally, as a part of lending money via a loan, the lender
charges a fee for lending the money in the form of interest against the person who is
borrowing until the loan is repaid.ss In an earnings stripping situation, the interest on the
aforementioned loan is deductible, and that deduction operates to offset the taxes that the U.S.
subsidiary owes to the United States Treasury Department on its earnings."' For example,
when foreign MNC "A" loans "X" sum of money to U.S. subsidiary "B" at "Y" interest rate,
U.S. subsidiary "B" deducts the "Y" interest from the "X" loan from its earnings, thereby
lowering the amount that the U.S. Treasury Department will tax U.S. subsidiary "B" based on
its offset earnings.
How will the new Treasury Department regulations curb earnings stripping
practices? The new rules keep foreign MNCs from stocking up their U.S. branches with
unnecessary debt because the interest to be paid by the U.S.-based subsidiaries will no longer
be deductible."' Essentially, this new regulation by the U.S. Treasury Department serves as a
patch fix for creative accounting undertaken by MNCs. Although these measures taken by the

See Hanlon, supra note 82
See id.
148 See
id.
146
14

149

See id.

150 See id.

s51 See id.
See Hanlon, supranote 82

152

153 See
154
155

id.
See Sahadi, supra note 80.
See Justine Pritchard, How Loans Work, THE BALANCE (Aug. 16, 2016), https://www.thebalance.com/how-

loans-work-315449.
See Sahadi, supra note 80.

156

157

See id.
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Treasury Department are a substantial step in the right direction, curbing corporate inversions
will necessitate Congressional action to close such loopholes by drafting new laws that will
operate as a permanent solution."'
C.

Donald Trump's Presidency and Its Effect on Tax Avoidance

As of noon on January 20, 2016, Donald Trump recited the Oath of Office and was
sworn in as the 45th President of the United States."'9 Soon thereafter, President Trump
began the process of nominating cabinet level officials to run his administration.1 6 0 As the
Secretary of the United States Treasury Department, President Trump selected former
Goldman Sachs banker, Steve Mnuchin.1 6 1 Mnuchin graduated from Yale in 1985 and went
on to spend 17 years at Goldman Sachs, until his departure in 2002. 162 Mnuchin then decided
to start his own Investment Firm, Dune Capital Management, that was later renamed
OneWest and sold to CIT Group in 2015. 1' Even though he has no prior political experience,
as the Secretary of the Treasury, Mnuchin is responsible for supervising banks, issuing debt
securities, supervising the IRS, and enforcing tax laws on behalf of every American citizen. 164
Furthermore, Mnuchin is charged with implementing the Trump Administration's proposed
business tax plan, which is targeted at growing the United States' economy.165
1.

PresidentTrump's Tax ProposalandIts Enforcement
Under President Trump's tax proposal, taxes on corporate income will be reduced
from the current rate of 35 percent to 15 percent16 6 and the corporate alternative minimum tax
("AMT") will be repealed. 167 Trump's tax plan also seeks to limit the top income tax rate on
pass-through businesses such as partnerships, LLCs, and S Corporations to no more than 15
158

See id.

159

David Lawler, When is Donald Trump's inaugurationas US president - and
what happens on the day?,

THE TELEGRAPH

(Jan. 14, 2016), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/0/donald-trumps-presidential-inauguration.

Trump's Team: Who's who in President's Cabinet, White House, Fox NEWS (Jan. 24, 2017),
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2017/01/24/trump-s-team-who-s-who-in-president-s-cabinet-white16

house.html.
161

Trump Nominates Steve

Mnuchin for

Treasury Secretary,

Fox NEWS

(Nov.

29,

2016),

http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2016/11/29/trump-to-nominate-steven-mnuchin-for-treasury-secretarysources-say.html.
162 See
163 See
164

id.

id.

Roger Yu and Kevin McCoy, Trump's Treasury nominee Steven Mnuchin denies he ran foreclosure

machine', USA TODAY (Jan. 19, 2017, 5:36 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2017/01/19/stevenmnuchin-face-questions-foreclosures-treasury-sec-hearing/96738000.

163 Tax Plan - Donald. Trump's Vision, TRUMP PENCE, https://www.donaldjtrump.com/policies/tax-plan
(last
visited Jan. 14, 2016).
'6 Jim Nunns et. al, An Analysis of Donald Trump's Tax Plan, TAX POLICY CENTER (Dec. 22, 2015),

http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/analysis-donald-trumps-tax-plan/full.
167 Corporate alternative minimum tax is a supplemental tax imposed by the Government in addition to
baseline income tax for certain corporations that utilize exemptions or other circumstances for lowering
payments of standard income tax. Id.
161

"Refers to how individual owners of a business pay taxes on income derived from that business on their

personal income tax returns. Pass through taxation applies to sole proprietorships, partnerships, and SCorporations. This is opposed to traditional, or C-Corporations, where the company itself pays corporate taxes
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percent.16 9 Additionally, the Trump plan will repeal most tax breaks for corporations,
President Trump's tax plan has the
sometimes referred to as deductions or tax subsidies.
potential to create significant changes to our tax code that could ultimately benefit not just
U.S.-based MNCs, but also American citizens. The effects to be derived from Trump's
proposal may seem tenuous now, but over the next few years there will be dramatic changes
that will, for better or for worse, affect the United States' position in the global economy.
Ironically, the person who is in charge of collecting our nation's tax revenue,
changing the tax code, and repealing tax breaks, has-himself-been accused of avoiding
In a Senate Committee on Finance session, Senator Ron Wyden, D-Oregon, pressed
taxes.
Mnuchin hard with questions that focused on tax inequality and offshore tax avoidance.172 As
a result, it came to light that Mnuchin's financial disclosure records show that he has seven
1 74
and another known as a "dynasty
personal trusts,1 7 3 including one based in Anguilla
17
taxes. 176 Even more concerning is
from
dollars
of
trust,", that could shield tens of millions
major personal financial assetsto
include
failed
Mnuchin's admission that he initially
million-in his federal financial
$95
at
roughly
valued
estate
including homes and real
are alarming because the
disclosures
financial
disclosure statement. 177 Secretary Mnuchin's
the very actions
contradict
directly
to
in
seems
engaged
has
conduct that Secretary Mnuchin
the tax code to
as,
restructuring
such
actions
conduct,
such
he claims he will take to prevent
as Secretary of
tax
abuse
offshore
and
preventing
viable,
make America more economically
the United
presidency,
Trump's
Donald
into
a
year
not
even
the Treasury. Being that we are
lie.
really
loyalties
Mnuchin's
Secretary
where
and
see
wait
States will just have to

on income the corporation derives." Pass-through taxation, CORNELL UNWERSITY LAW SCHOOL LEGAL
INFORMATION INSTITUTE, https://www.law.comell.edulwex/pass-through_taxation (last visited Jan 11, 2016).
169 See Nunns et. al, supra note 166.
o Id.
171 See Yu and McCoy, supra note 158; see also Alan Rappeport, Steven Mnuchin, Treasury Nominee, Failed
2017),
19,
(Jan.
TIMES
YORK
NEW
THE
Million in Assets,
Disclose $100
to
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/19/us/politics/steven-mnuchin-treasury-secretary-nominee-assetsconfirmation.html; see generally Ylan Q. Mui and Ed O'Keefe, Treasury nominee initially omitted more than
$100 million from disclosures, Democratic memo says, THE WASH. POST (Jan. 19, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/01/19/treasury-nominee-initially-omitted-more-than100-million-from-disclosures-democratic-memo-shows/?utmterm=.a464ed7bf053; Sheelah Kolhatkar, Steve
Mnuchin
and
the
Tax-Haven
Divide,
THE
NEW
YORKER
(Jan.
20,
2017),
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/steven-mnuchin-and-the-tax-haven-divide.
172 Yu and McCoy, supra note 171.
173 What Is a Trust, FIDELITY, https://www.fidelity.com/estate-planning-inheritance/estate-planning/trusts (last
visited Feb. 1, 2017).

1

See generally Streber, Offshore Jurisdiction Review-Anguilla, CASEY RESEARCH INTERNATIONAL MAN,

http://www.intemationalman.com/articles/offshore-jurisdiction-review-anguilla (last visited Feb 1. 2017).
175 See generally Dynasty Trust, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/dynasty-trust.asp (last
visited Feb. 1, 2017).
176 Yu and McCoy, supranote 171.
17 See Yu and McCoy, supra note 171 (noting that the assets include a New York City co-op in one of
Manhattan's most exclusive buildings, an oceanside vacation home in Southampton and real estate in Mexico).
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2.

Border Tax
One tax that is already making headlines because of President Trump is, as Trump
has called it, a "border tax.""' Trump, in a series of tweets, threatened several companies
with a "big border tax" if they expand manufacturing facilities abroad for products that will
be sold in the U.S. 179 The border tax would require U.S.-based MNCs that move out of the
United States to pay a 35 percent tax on products they ship back to the U.S. for sale.' In
January 2017, Sean Spicer, the White House Press Secretary and Communications Director,
gave reporters some insight as to the purpose of the tax, stating that Donald Trump "had been
focused on [taxing] U.S.-based employers that move overseas for the express purpose of
selling [goods] back to the U.S. market [utilizing] non-U.S. workers."'
Just as President Trump's other tax proposals seek to keep U.S.-based MNCs in the
United States and keep them from avoiding taxes, Trump's border tax could accomplish the
same objective with the added benefit of gaining revenue from MNCs that subject themselves
to border tax liability.1 82 In January 2017, Ford Motor Company scrapped a $1.6 billion plan
to build a car factory in Mexico after receiving criticism from President Trump, including
threatening the company with the border tax.' 8 3 Subsequently, the company is set to invest
$700 million to expand the Flat Rock, Michigan factory and add 700 new jobs to that
factory.1 8 4 Ford CEO Mark Fields said, "our view is that we see a more positive U.S.
manufacturing business environment under President-elect Trump and the pro-growth policies
and [tax] proposals that he's talking about, so this is a vote of confidence for President-elect
Trump and some of the policies that [he] may be pursuing."'8 5 Ford's behavior might signal
the end of a tax avoidance era, where new taxes will be structured to be unavoidable while
still benefiting the companies they are levied against and the people whom the revenue
generated is meant to serve.
IV. SOLUTION
Due to the negative effects of tax avoidance by MNCs and the unfair financial
burden that it imposes on American citizens, is it is obvious that things need to change;
however, this will not be easy because, as previously mentioned, the majority of practices that
MNCs engage in are technically legal under the current tax code.' 8 6 Until we have broad tax
reform in the United States and significantly change the incentives that fuel compliance with
the tax code, tax avoidance by the largest and most profitable MNCs will continue unabated.

17' Timothy A. Clary, What does Trump's 'big border tax' threat
really mean?, CNBC (Jan. 9, 2017),
http://www.cnbc.com/2017/01/09/what-does-trumps-big-border-tax-threat-really-mean.html.
1' See id

180 See id.

181 See id
182 See generally Steve Holland, Exclusive: Trump says Republican border tax could boost US. jobs, REUTERS
(Feb. 24, 2017, 7:20 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-tax-exclusive-idUSKBN1622J5.
183 Bernie Woodall and David Sherpardson, Chided by Trump, Ford scraps Mexico factory, adds Michigan
jobs, REUTERS (Jan. 3, 2017), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-autos-idUSKBN14NTO.

14
185
186

See id
See id.
See supra Part II.
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A.

The Trump Administration's Proposal and Possible Modifications

7
Towards this end and as it relates to unrepatriated'1 foreign income of MNCs based
in the United States, President Trump has proposed new tax laws that could move the Nation
one step closer to a viable solution.' The legislation that has been proposed by President
Trump seeks to impose a one-time transition tax of up to ten percent on existing foreign
income of MNCs based in the United States that will be payable over ten years.1s9 For
example, if ABC Company had $20 million in profits held overseas, ABC Company would be
required to pay $2 million over the course of ten years in addition to their regular income tax
obligation. Being that ABC Company's domestic tax liability under Trump's proposed plan
would be assessed at 15 percent,1 90 ABC Company would owe the IRS $3 million in income
tax. Adding ABC Company's income tax obligation to their one-time transition tax, one is
faced with a $5 million total tax liability due to the IRS. Though this number may seem high,
if one were to compare this number with what would be owed under the current income tax
rate of 35 percent, one could manifestly observe that there would be $3 million in savings for
ABC Company, as its tax obligation would be $7 million under the current scheme. Further,
under Trump's plan, future profits of foreign subsidiaries of MNCs based in the United States
would be taxed each year as the profits are earned, thereby ending the current law's deferral
of tax on these profits until they are repatriated. '9'
Large reductions in the corporate tax rate, along with ending deferral of tax until the
profits are repatriated, could reduce the incentive for MNCs to re-characterize their domestic
profits as foreign-sourced to avoid United States tax liabilities.192 Moreover, the lower
corporate tax rate could also decrease the incentive for MNCs based in the United States to
engage in inversions, as discussed previously, through moving their tax residence overseas.193
The ten percent tax on profits held overseas by MNCs based in the United States, and taxing
those MNCs' future overseas profits, could trigger a huge inflow of funds back to the United
States, 194 thereby alleviating some of the financial burdens that are being placed on American
citizens and our federal budget. 19s
Despite the benefits that may result from President Trump's tax proposal, there are
some deficiencies that may require alternative solutions that have not yet been proposed. For
one, MNCs may not be willing to pay a one-time transition tax in addition to their normal
income tax obligation (consider the aforementioned example with ABC Company).

187 Repatriation occurs when U.S.-based MNCs relocate their overseas profits back to the United States,
thereby subjecting those profits to the United States Tax Code.
1 TRUMP PENCE, supra note 165.
189 Nunns et. al, supra note 166.
190 TRUMP PENCE, supra note 165.
'9' Nunns et. al, supra note 166.
192 Id.
19 Id.
'94 Robert W. Wood, Trump Tax Plan Could Impact 2016 Year-End Planning, FORBES (Nov. 14, 2016),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2016/11/14/trump-tax-plan-could-impact-2016-year-endplanning/#62cac744530d.
'9 See CONG. REC., supra note 139.
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B.

Alternative Solutions

As an alternative, the United States Treasury Department could levy a five percent
annual tax on the stock of unrepatriated offshore profits of United States based MNCs. 19 6 A
five percent tax on the approximately $3 trillion in stock held overseas would produce $150
billion in tax revenue per year, while also inducing companies to repatriate their profits back
to the United States, where they would then have to pay corporate income tax. 197 Because the
five percent tax continues until the MNC repatriates its profits, there is a continual incentive
for the MNC to act. The only shortcoming that might be unattractive to MNCs is the
requirement that the MNC pay domestic income tax in addition to the annual tax.
A possible solution to this shortcoming could be having the IRS provide a
discounted rate for a specified term, for example, providing an income tax rate of only ten
percent for five years to a MNC that is repatriating its offshore profits. For example, if ABC
Company decided to repatriate its overseas profits ($20 million) in 2017, ABC Company
would have to pay $1 million towards the five percent annual tax and $2 million towards their
domestic income tax obligation for a total of $3 million. Going forward until 2022, instead of
paying 15 percent under President Trump's proposal or 35 percent if the proposal is rejected,
ABC Company would continue to make a ten percent income tax contribution ($2 million) for
a total of $10 million over five years as opposed to between $15 and $35 million for the same
period.
A solution that is perhaps more onerous on the MNCs, would be if the United States
Treasury Department set a minimum tax rate of at least 25 to 30 percent on profits of all
European and American MNCs.198 Although this solution is the most unattractive to MNCs, if
one country, such as the United States, takes a tough stance on this issue, the hope is that
other countries around the world will follow suit.? This domino effect would create a
beneficial impact not only for American citizens, but also on the global economy because
justly due revenue will no longer be escaping the grasps of jurisdictions that are rightly owed.
C.

Senator Bernie Sanders's Corporate Tax Dodging Prevention Act of 2017

In March of 2017, Senator Bernie Sanders, I-Vermont, offered legislation in the
form of the Corporate Tax Dodging Prevention Act of 2017.200 The bill is aimed at preventing
corporations from avoiding U.S. taxes and stops rewarding companies with tax breaks that
send jobs and factories overseas.20 1 If this bill is enacted, it is projected to raise at least $1
trillion in revenue over the course of ten years. 202 Senator Sanders's motivation for drafting
196

See Goldhammer, supranote 64, at 8.

197 See id.
198 See id
199 See id.

The Corporate Tax Dodging Prevention Act of 2017, S. 586, 114th Cong. (2017).
Naomi Jagoda, Sanders offers bill aimed at preventing corporate tax avoidance, THE HILL
(Mar. 9, 2017,
12:33 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/finance/323187-sanders-offers-bill-aimed-at-preventing-corporate-tax200
201

avoidance; The Corporate Tax Dodging Prevention Act of 2017, BERNIE SANDERS: U.S. SENATOR FOR

VERMONT (Mar. 9, 2017), https://www.sanders.senate.gov/download/corporate-tax-dodging-prevention-act2017-summary?inline=file [hereinafter Tax DodgingAct of2017].
202 Tax DodgingAct of2017, supra
note 201.
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the bill stems from the fact that most MNCs pay less than the statutory corporate tax rate of
35 percent.20 3 When addressing the bill, Sanders stated, "the truth is that we have a rigged tax
204
code that has essentially legalized tax-dodging for large corporations."
Accordingly, the Corporate Tax Dodging Prevention Act seeks to reform the tax
code in seven major ways: (1) ending the rule allowing American corporations to defer
20
paying federal income tax on profits of their offshore subsidiaries; S (2) transitioning to new
rules by imposing a one-time tax of 35 percent on profits currently held offshore by American
corporations;2 0 6 (3) closing loopholes allowing American corporations to artificially inflate or
accelerate their foreign tax credits;207 (4) preventing American corporations from claiming to
208
(5) preventing American
be foreign by using a tax haven post office as their address;
20 9
corporations
foreign-owned
(6)
prevent
by
inverting;
U.S.
taxes
corporations from avoiding
21 0
(7)
preventing
and
debt
expenses;
manipulating
U.S.
by
of
the
from stripping earnings out
as foreign
governments
to
foreign
payments
royalty
disguising
large oil companies from
211
taxes.
The first reform is necessary as the Congressional Research Service has indicated
212
that this type of tax avoidance costs the U.S. Treasury approximately $100 billion annually.
Ending this rule should contribute to curtailing the incentive to either move operations/jobs to
a lower tax country, or to use accounting tricks to make U.S. profits appear to be earned in a
lower-tax county.213 Under the second reform, the one-time tax would serve as a transition to
the new rules under this bill, where corporations would be allowed to pay the tax over a
2 14
period of eight years and could still use foreign tax credits. Under the third reform, foreign
tax credits generated by profits earned in one country could not be used against U.S. income
tax on profits earned in another country.215 This would end the current practice of MNCs
using foreign tax credits to pay less tax on their U.S. taxable income than they would if all
income was from solely U.S. sources (thereby ending MNCs competitive advantage over
216
The fourth reform would prevent a
companies that are entirely based in the U.S.).
corporation from claiming to be foreign if its management and control operations are located
in the United States.2 1 7 Under the fifth reform, MNCs that carry out a tax inversion to locate
203

Jagoda, supra note 201.

See id.
S. 586, 114th Cong. § 2.
206 Id.
207 Under current legislation, U.S. taxpayers are taxed on their income worldwide, but are entitled to a dollarfor-dollar tax credit for any income taxes that are paid to a foreign government (i.e. the foreign tax credit).
American corporations are allowed to receive the same credit, which operates to reduce their federal income tax
liability by an amount equal to whatever income taxes are paid to foreign governments on their overseas profits.
Tax DodgingAct of2017, supra note 201; S. 586, 114th Cong. § 4.
208 S. 586, 114th Cong. § 5.
209 id.
204
205

210
211
212

S. 586, 114th Cong. § 6.
S. 586, 114th Cong. § 3.
Tax DodgingAct of 2017, supra note 201.

213

id.

214

id
id
id

215
216
217

id.
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its operations abroad would be taxed as an American corporation so long as a majority of the
inverted corporation is owned by the American party to the inversion. 218 As it relates to the
sixth reform, often times loans are made between entities owned by the same parent company,
which means that they are really an accounting fiction and the only real consequence is a
lower U.S. income tax liability. 2 1 9 Under the sixth reform, a U.S. affiliate of a foreign owned
MNC "would not be allowed to deduct interest expenses that are disproportionate to its share
of income of the entire corporate group (the entire group of corporates owned by the same
parent company)." 22 0 In regards to the seventh reform, "U.S. oil and gas companies have been
disguising royalty payments to foreign governments as foreign taxes in order to claim foreign
tax credits." 22 1 Under the seventh reform, this loophole would be closed.2 22
In proposing this bill, Senator Sanders has done a remarkable job researching the
major issues that plague our tax system as it relates to corporate tax avoidance. The methods
of reform are issue-focused, reasonable-and most importantly-practical, in light of the
magnitude of the tax avoidance problems facing this country. However, one refinement that
could be made to Senator Sanders's Corporate Tax Dodging and Prevention Act would be to
change the one-time tax of 35 percent under the second reform to somewhere between 15 and
25 percent. Having a lower one-time tax rate could create more of an incentive to repatriate
overseas profits in that that lower rate presents itself as a "deal" at the negotiating table with
MNCs, rather than the default rate (35 percent) that MNCs would have to pay anyway.
V.

CONCLUSION

The United States is a global economic leader with one of the most advanced
223
economies in the world. Other countries are not so fortunate, and therefore, it is incumbent
upon the United States to make economic decisions that will serve as an example to
developing nations and those with whom we stand on an equal playing field.22 4 This includes
making tedious decisions with regard to how our government treats the entities that are able to
reap the numerous benefits that are afforded to them by way of United States citizenship or by
way of incorporation under United States law. Adopting an isolationist position or an antiglobalization position, as has been floated around by President Trump,225 is dangerous
because of the negative effects that could impact our domestic economy and the global
economy at large.
Unless our legislators change their position on the structure of the tax code, tax
avoidance practices will continue to thrive and evolve as MNCs continue to develop ever
more clever strategies for avoiding their tax obligation. The key is to find a way to change
how MNCs think of income tax and how they approach it. This might involve setting new
income tax rates, new exemptions, or any other device that enables a MNC based in the
218
219
220

Id. See supra Part III.B.
Tax DodgingAct of2017, supra note 201.
Tax DodgingAct of2017, supra note 201.

221

id.

222

id.

Desmond Lachman, The World Needs U.S. Economic Leadership, THE DETROIT NEws (Aug. 18, 2016),
http://www.detroitnews.com/story/opinion/2016/08/18/economic-leadership/88982778/.
223

224 See id.
225 See generally
id
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United States to pay their income tax as a normal course of operation, without avoiding the
obligation as being cost-ineffective for its shareholders. The Treasury Department will need
to continue to develop tax plans and incentives that are attractive to MNCs based in the
United States, as well as foreign MNCs, if the United States is to remain a global economic
leader.

354

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/jibl/vol16/iss2/12

22

Morgenstern: Corporate Tax Avoidance: Addressing the Merits of Preventing Mult

MAURICE A. DEANE SCHOOL OF LAW AT HOFSTRA UNIVERSITY

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICERS
Adonza S. Anderson, Interim Assistant Deanfor EnrollmentManagement
Andrew E. Berman, B.A., M.B.A., Assistant Deanfor Communications
Andrew Schepard, B.A., M.A., J.D., Senior Associate Deanfor Academic
Affairs and Max Schmertz DistinguishedProfessor of Law
Barbara Stark, B.A., J.D., LL.M., Professor ofLaw and John DeWitt Gregory
Research Scholar
Brian T. Kaspar, B.S., M.B.A., Assistant DeanforAcademic Records andRegistrar
Christopher Caruso, B.A., J.D., Associate Deanfor CareerServices
Courtney Selby, B.A., J.D., M.L.I.S., Associate Deanfor Information Services,
Directorof the Law Library & Associate ProfessorofLaw
Daphne Telfeyan, Interim Assistant Deanfor CareerServices
Dimitrios M. Doussi, B.A., Assistant Registrar
Dominick J. Grillo, B.A., M.S., J.D., Assistant Directorfor Technological Services
Donna Brower, B.S., M.S., Ed., DirectorofDevelopment
Elizabeth Carline, B.B.A., J.D., Directorof Career andProfessionalDevelopment
Eric Lane, B.A., M.A, J.D., LL.M., Dean and Eric J Schmertz Distinguished
Professor ofPublicLaw and Public Service
Franca Sachs, B.A., J.D., Executive DirectorofPro Bono, Externship and
Fellowship Programs
Gerard Anderson, B.A., M.A., DirectorofFinancialAid
Honorable A. Gail Prudenti, B.A., L.L.B., Executive Director of the Centerfor
Children, Families and the Law andSenior Associate Deanfor Operations
Isaac Samuels, B.A., J.D., M.L.S., Reference Librarian
Jennifer A. Gundlach, B.A., J.D., Senior Associate Deanfor Academic Affairs and
ExperientialEducationand ClinicalProfessorofLaw
Jessica Backman, Assistant DirectorofInformation Technology Services
Jodie D. Sperico, Senior DirectorofAlumni Affairs
John Tsiforas, B.A., J.D., Director ofAnalytic and ProgramEvaluation & Assistant
DirectorofAcademic Support and Bar Preparation,and Visiting Assistant

1

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2017

23

Journal of International Business and Law, Vol. 16, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 12

Professor ofAcademic Support
Judith N. Black, B.S., Directorof Special Events and Facilitiesand CLE Director
Kenneth J. Selvester, B.A., M.A., Associate Directorof Communications
Kevin Shelton, B.A., M.A., J.D., M.S.L.I.S., Reference and Government Documents
Librarian
Linda P. Russo, M.L.S., B.A., Assistant Directorfor Technical Services
Lisa A. Spar, B.A., J.D., M.S., Assistant Directorfor Reference andInstructional
Services
Lisa Berman, B.A., Assistant Deanfor ExternalRelations
Lisa Monticciolo, B.A., J.D., Associate Deanfor Students and Administration
Maricia McCoy, Recruiter/Counselorfor Enrollment Management
Mary Godfrey-Rickards, B.A., J.D., M.L.S., Assistant Directorfor Access and
Collection Services
Mary T. Ruggilo, B.A., J.D., Senior Associate Deanfor Finance
Matthew G. Kiernan, B.A., J.D., Directorofpilot Projectsfor the Centerfor
Children, Families and the Law andManagingEditor ofFamily CourtReview
Megan Meighan, Associate DirectorofEnrollment Management
Michael G. Wagner, B.S., Senior Web Developer
Michele LoFaso, Senior DirectorofStudent Affairs
&

Nicole R. Lefton, B.A., J.D., DirectorofAcademic Support and Bar Preparation
Assistant Professor ofAcademic Support and Bar Preparation
Patricia A. Kasting, B.A., J.D., M.L.S., Reference Librarian
Rachel Andron, DirectorofPublic Sector CareerPlanning
Rou-Chia P. Lin, B.A., M.L.S., Access and Collection Services Librarian
Ryan Larson, B.A., J.D., Assistant DirectorofEnrollmentManagement
Scott C. Filipkowski, B.B.A., M.B.A, Senior DirectorofInformation Technology
Services
Scott J. Glick, B.A., J.D., Directorof the Hofstra Law in D.C. Program and
Visiting ProfessorofLaw
Steven Richman, B.A., J.D., M.A., Senior Directorof GlobalInitiatives
Teresa Harrington, B.A., M.S., OperationsManager- Personnel
Tobie-Lynn Accardi, B.F.A., CreativeDirector
Toni L. Aiello, B.A., J.D., M.S.L.S., Reference Librarian
Vemadette Home, B.A., J.D., Directorof Career andProfessionalDevelopment
and Diversity Initiatives

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/jibl/vol16/iss2/12

24

Morgenstern: Corporate Tax Avoidance: Addressing the Merits of Preventing Mult

Wendy Chaite, B.S., J.D., Director of Career and ProfessionalDevelopment
Yvonne V. Atkinson, B.S., M.S., Office Manager/Paralegal,Law School Clinical
Program

FACULTY
Robert Abrams, B.A., J.D., SpecialProfessorofLaw
Burton C. Agata, A.B., J.D., LL.M., ProfessorEmeritus ofLaw
Erica Aisner, SpecialProfessorofLaw
Miriam Albert, B.A., J.D., M.B.A., LL.M., Professor of Skills and FacultyAdvisor
for the JD./M B.A. Program
Robert Archer, Special ProfessorofLaw
Kennisha Austin, Visiting Assistant ProfessorofLaw
The Honorable Leonard B. Austin, B.A., J.D., SpecialProfessor ofLaw
Kenneth Balkan, J.D., SpecialProfessorofLaw
Barbara S. Barron, B.A., M.A., J.D., Professorof Skills, Directorof the Trial
Techniques Program, Directorof Student Advocacy Programsand FacultyAdvisor
to Moot Court Board
Leslie R. Bennett, B.A., J.D., Special Professor ofLaw
Steven C. Bennett, B.A., J.D., Special ProfessorofLaw
Deborah Berger, B.S., J.D., SpecialProfessor ofLaw
Lee Bergstein, Special Professor ofLaw
Robert Biancavilla, B.A., J.D., M.P.S., A.S., Special ProfessorofLaw
The Honorable Joseph Bianco, Special Professor ofLaw
Richard Bock, B.A., J.D., SpecialProfessorofLaw
Robert A. Baruch Bush, B.A., J.D., HarryH. Rains DistinguishedProfessorof
Arbitrationand Alternative Dispute Settlement Law
Yishai Boyarin, B.A., J.D., LL.M., Associate ClinicalProfessor ofLaw and
Associate DeanforIntellectualLife
Lawrence Jay Braunstein, B.A., J.D., Special ProfessorofLaw
William Burdo, Special Professor ofLaw
Alafair S. Burke, B.A., J.D., ProfessorofLaw
Nancy Burner, Special Professor ofLaw
Allison Caffarone, Assistant ProfessorofLegal Writing
Juli Campagna, B.A., M.A., J.D., LL.M., Professor ofLegal Writing andAssistant
FacultyDirector ofInternationalPrograms
Andrez Carberry, B.A., M.A., J.D., Special ProfessorofLaw
Ralph H. Cathcart, Special Professor ofLaw

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2017

25

Journal of International Business and Law, Vol. 16, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 12

Robin Charlow, A.B., J.D., ProfessorofLaw
J. Scott Colesanti, B.A., J.D., LL.M., ProfessorofLegal Writing
Ronald J. Colombo, B.S., J.D., Professorof Law andAssociate Dean for Distance
Education
Peter Contino, Special ProfessorofLaw
The Honorable R. Bruce Cozzens, Special ProfessorofLaw
The Honorable Edmund Dane, SpecialProfessorofLaw
J. Herbie DiFonzo, B.S., J.D., M.A., Ph.D., ProfessorofLaw
Janet L. Dolgin, B.A., M.A., Ph.D., J.D., Jack and FredaDicker Distinguished
Professorof Health Care Law; Professorof Science Education, HofstraNorthwell
School ofMedicine; Co-director, Hofstra Bioethics Center, and Director, Gitenstein
Institute for Health Law andPolicy
Tracy Dunbrook, B.A., J.D., LL.M., Visiting Assistant ProfessorofLaw
Akilah N. Folami, B.A., J.D., ProfessorofLaw
Susan Fortney, B.A., J.D., LL.M., J.S.D., HowardLichtenstein Distinguished
ProfessorofLegal Ethics and Directorof the Institutefor the Study ofLegal Ethics
Eric M. Freedman, B.A., J.D., M.A., MauriceA. Deane DistinguishedProfessor of
ConstitutionalLaw
Leon Friedman, A.B., LL.B., Joseph Kushner DistinguishedProfessorof Civil
Liberties Law
Linda Galler, B.A., J.D., LL.M., Professor ofLaw
Mitchell Gans, B.B.A., J.D., Rivkin Radler DistinguishedProfessorofLaw
The Honorable Kenneth L. Gartner, B.A., J.D., Special Professorof Law
Ashleigh Garvey, Special ProfessorofLaw
Dolores Gebhardt, B.S., J.D., Special ProfessorofLaw
James F. Gesualdi, Esq., B.A., M.A., J.D., Special ProfessorofLaw
George Giuliani, B.A., M.S., M.A., J.D., Psy.D., Special ProfessorofLaw
Scott J. Glick, B.A., J.D., Directorof the Hofstra Law in D.C. Externship Program
and Special ProfessorofLaw
Barry Goldberg, SpecialProfessor ofLaw
Daniel J. H. Greenwood, A.B., J.D., Professor ofLaw
John DeWitt Gregory, B.A., J.D., Sidney and Walter Siben DistinguishedProfessor
of Family Law
Joanna L. Grossman, B.A., J.D. ProfessorofLaw
Frank Gulino, B.A., J.D., Associate Professor of Legal Writing
Jennifer A. Gundlach, B.A., J.D., ClinicalProfessorofLaw

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/jibl/vol16/iss2/12

26

Morgenstern: Corporate Tax Avoidance: Addressing the Merits of Preventing Mult
Michael Haber, B.A., M.A., J.D., Associate ClinicalProfessor ofLaw and
Associate-in-Charge, Community andEconomic Development Clinic
Marc L. HamroffSpecialProfessorof Law
Robert Harper, Special ProfessorofLaw
Carol Casazza Herman, B.A. J.D., Visiting Practitioner-in-Residencein
Environmental Law and SpecialProfessorofLaw
James Edward Hickey, Jr., B.S., J.D., Ph.D., Professor ofLaw
The Honorable Richard Horowitz, Special Professor ofLaw
John Hogan, Special ProfessorofLaw
Bernard E. Jacob, B.A., J.D., Ph.D., DistinguishedProfessorEmeritus ofLaw
Michael D. Jaffe, B.A., J.D., Special ProfessorofLaw
Alan Jakimo, B.A., M.B.A., J.D., SpecialProfessorofLaw
Susan H. Joffe, B.A., M.A., J.D., Professorof Legal Writing
Gary Kalbaugh, BCL, LL.M., SpecialProfessorofLaw
Kara Kaplan, SpecialProfessorofLaw
Elena Karabatos, SpecialProfessorofLaw
David A. Kaufman, B.A., J.D., Special Professor ofLaw
Lawrence Kessler, B.A., J.D., RichardJ CardaliDistinguishedProfessor of Trial
Advocacy
Avi Z. Kestenbaum, B.S., J.D., LL.M., Special Professor ofLaw
Brian Klein, Special ProfessorofLaw
Fred Klein, B.A., J.D., Visiting Assistant Professor ofLaw
Spencer Klein, SpecialProfessorofLaw
The Honorable Gary F. Knobel, B.A., J.D., LL.M., SpecialProfessor ofLaw
Abe Krieger, SpecialProfessorofLaw
Stefan Krieger, B.A., J.D., Professor of Law, Directorof CenterforApplied Legal
Reasoning and DirectorEmeritus ofHofstra ClinicalPrograms
Julian Ku, B.A., J.D., ProfessorofLaw andFaculty DirectorofInternational
Programs
Katrina Fischer Kuh, B.A., J.D., ProfessorofLaw
Lawrence Kurland, Special ProfessorofLaw
Eric Lane, B.A., M.A., J.D., LL.M., Dean and Eric J Schmertz Distinguished
Professor ofPublic Law andPublic Service
Anibal Rosario Lebron, J.D., LL.M., Visiting Assistant Professor ofLegal Writing
Richard G. Leland, B.S., J.D., Special ProfessorofLaw
Theo Liebmann, B.A., J.D., ClinicalProfessorofLaw and Directorof Clinical
Programs

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2017

27

Journal of International Business and Law, Vol. 16, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 12

Barry Lites, Special ProfessorofLaw
Kim Luckey, Special ProfessorofLaw
Barbara A. Lukeman, B.A., J.D., SpecialProfessor ofLaw
Andrew H. Lupu, B.A., J.D., SpecialProfessorofLaw
Malachy T. Mahon, B.A., J.D., FoundingDean Emeritus
Lewis R. Mandel, A.B., J.D., LL.M., Special ProfessorofLaw
Irina D. Manta, B.A., J.D., Professorof Law andDirectorof the Centerfor
IntellectualProperty Law at the MauriceA. Deane School ofLaw
Serge Martinez, B.A., J.D., ClinicalProfessor ofLaw
The Honorable Edward W. McCarty III, B.S., J.D., Special ProfessorofLaw
Gerald McCloskey, Special Professor ofLaw
Kevin McElroy, B.A., J.D., Associate Professor ofLegal Writing
Christopher T. McGrath, SpecialProfessorofLaw
Gerard Messina, Special ProfessorofLaw
Janis Meyer, Special ProfessorofLaw
Richard K. Neumann, Jr., B.A., Dipl., J.D., LL.M., Professor ofLaw
Christopher Nicolino, SpecialProfessor ofLaw
Andrew Oringer, J.D., M.B.A., A.B., Special ProfessorofLaw
Ashira Ostrow, B.A., J.D., ProfessorofLawand Associate Dean for Research and
Faculty
Mark Padin, B.A., M.S., J.D., Associate ProfessorofAcademic Support
Peter Parcher, Special ProfessorofLaw
Curtis Pew, B.A., M.P.P.A., J.D., Visiting ClinicalProfessorofLaw
Damian Pieper, Special Professorof Law
John Pieper, B.A., J.D., LL.M., Special ProfessorofLaw
Troy Pieper, Special ProfessorofLaw
Jack M. Platt, Esq., B.A., J.D., Special ProfessorofLaw
Neal R. Platt, B.S., J.D., L.L.M., Special Professor ofLaw
Rona L. Platt, B.S., J.D., SpecialProfessorofLaw
Seth A. Presser, J.D., SpecialProfessor ofLaw
Andrew Reiss, Special ProfessorofLaw
Arianne Reyser, Special ProfessorofLaw
Joseph Richetti, Special ProfessorofLaw
John L. Rivkin, B.A., J.D., SpecialProfessorofLaw
Anibal Rosario Lebron, J.D., LL.M., Visiting Assistant Professor ofLegal Writing
Jared Rosenblatt, Special Professor ofLaw

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/jibl/vol16/iss2/12

28

Morgenstern: Corporate Tax Avoidance: Addressing the Merits of Preventing Mult

Paul Rubell, B.A., J.D., Special Professor ofLaw
Ben B. Rubinowitz, B.A., J.D., Special Professor ofLaw
James Sample, B.A., J.D., Professor ofLaw
Andrew Schepard, B.A., M.A., J.D., Professor of Law and Directorof the Center
for Children, Families and the Law
Robert Schwenkel, Special ProfessorofLaw
Courtney Selby, B.A., J.D., M.L.I.S., Associate Deanfor Information Services,
Director of the Law Library & Associate Professor of Law
Rita Sethi, SpecialProfessorofLaw
Grant Shehigian, Special ProfessorofLaw
Gregory H. Shill, B.A., M.A., J.D., Visiting Assistant Professor ofLaw
Norman I. Silber, B.A., M.A., Ph.D., J.D., Professor ofLaw
Jeffrey Silberfeld, B.A., J.D., Visiting Assistant Professor of Law
Ronald H. Silverman, B.A., J.D., DistinguishedProfessorEmeritus ofLaw
Roy D. Simon, B.A., J.D., DistinguishedProfessor ofEmeritus ofLaw
William M. Skehan, B.A., M.B.A., J.D., Special Professor ofLaw
David Smith, Special ProfessorofLaw
Judd Sneirson, B.A., J.D., Visiting Associate Professor ofLaw
Lisa Spar, B.A., J.D., M.S., Special Professor ofLaw
Barbara Stark, B.A., J.D., LL.M., ProfessorofLaw and HofstraResearch Fellow,
Associate Deanfor IntellectualLife
Amy R. Stein, B.A., J.D., Professorof Legal Writing, Assistant Deanfor Adjunct
Instruction, and Coordinatorof the Legal Writing Program
Michael Steinberg, Special ProfessorofLaw
Jacob L. Stevens, B.A., J.D., Visiting Associate ClinicalProfessorofLaw
Daniel M. Sullivan, B.A., J.D., Special Professor ofLaw
Michael Vecchione, Special Professor ofLaw
Robert Wagner, Visiting Assistant ProfessorofLaw
Vern R. Walker, B.A., M.A., Ph.D., J.D., Professor of Law and Directorof the
Research Laboratoryfor Law, Logic and Technology
Bennett J. Wasserman, B.A., M.A., J.D., Special ProfessorofLaw
Stephen Weiner, B.A., J.D., Special Professor ofLaw
Joel Weintraub, A.B., M.D., J.D., SpecialProfessor ofLaw
Karen Weiss, VisitingAssistant Professor ofLegal Writing
Carolyn Reinach Wolf, B.A., M.B.A., M.S., J.D., SpecialProfessorofLaw
Lauris Wren, B.A., J.D., ClinicalProfessor of Law andDirectorfor the LGBT
Fellowship

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2017

29

Journal of International Business and Law, Vol. 16, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 12

Patrick Young, Special ProfessorofLaw
Elizabeth M. Nevins, B.A., J.D., Assistant ClinicalProfessorofLaw Attorney-in
charge, CriminalJustice Clinic

FRANK G. ZARB SCHOOL OF BUSINESS
ADMINISTRATION
Barbara J. Church-Kattan, Directorof Graduate CareerPlacement
Brian Caligiure, Assistant Deanfor Administration
Dr. George Papaioannou, Vice Dean
Dr. Patrick J. Socci, Dean
Jeffrey D. Mon, Directorof Recruitment
Kevin B. Taylor, Executive Directorof GraduatePrograms
Lisa A Welch, Associate directorof GraduatePrograms
Lisa A. Kellerman, Associate Directorof Graduate CareerPlacement
Ms. Gioia P. Bales, Associate Dean
Patricia Salama, Director of OutreachPrograms
FULL TIME FACULTY
Dr. Ahmet K. Karagozoglu, ProfessorofBanking & Finance
Dr. Andrew C. Spieler, Associate ProfessorofBanking & Finance
Dr. Andrew M. Forman, Associate Professor ofMarketing & IB
Dr. Anil Mathur, Chair, Department ofMarketing & IB
Dr. Anoop Rai, ProfessorofBanking & Finance
Dr. Anthony Basile, ProfessorofAccounting & Legal Studies
Dr. Barry Berman, ProfessorofMarketing & IB
Dr. Benny Barak, Professor ofMarketing & lB
Dr. Bernard H. Dickman, Associate Professor of QM/IT
Dr. Boonghee Yoo, Professor ofMarketing & InternationalBusiness
Dr. Charles A. McMellon, Associate Professor ofMarketing & IB
Dr. Charles H. Smith, ProfessorofManagement, Entrepreneurship& GB
Dr. Cheryl R. Lehman, ProfessorofAccounting & Legal Studies
Dr. Daniel Tinkelman, Associate Professor ofAccounting & Legal Studies
Dr. Dave Flynn, Professor ofManagement, Entrepreneurship& GB

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/jibl/vol16/iss2/12

30

Morgenstern: Corporate Tax Avoidance: Addressing the Merits of Preventing Mult
Dr. David N. Sessions, Associate Professorof QM/IT
Dr. Deb Sledgianowski, Associate ProfessorofAccounting & Legal Studies
Dr. Debra R. Comer, ProfessorofManagement, Entrepreneurship& GB
Dr. Edward J. Zychowicz, Professor ofBanking & Finance
Dr. Ehsan Nikbakht, ProfessorBanking & Finance
Dr. Elaine R. Winston, Chair, Department oflIT/QM
Dr. Elaine Sherman, Professor Marketing & IB
Dr. Elizabeth K. Venuti, Chair, Department ofAccounting & Legal Studies
Dr. Farrokh Guiahi, Professor ofIT/QM
Dr. Janet A. Lenaghan, Professor ofManagement, Entrepreneurship& GB
Dr. Joel R. Evans, ProfessorofMarketing & IB
Dr. John F. Affisco, ProfessorofIT/QM
Dr. K. G. Viswanathan, Chair, Department ofBanking & Finance
Dr. Kaushik Sengupta, Assoc. ProfessorofManagement, Entrepreneurship& GB
Dr. Keun S. Lee, Associate ProfessorofMarketing & IB
Dr. Laura H. Lally, Professor ofIT/QM
Dr. Li-lian Gao, Chair, Dept. ofManagement, Entrepreneurship& GB
Dr. Lonnie K. Stevans, Associate ProfessorofIT/QM
Dr. M. J. Paknejad, Professorof IT/QM
Dr. Mahesh Chandra, Associate ProfessorofIT/QM
Dr. Matthew C. Sonfield, ProfessorofManagement, Entrepreneurship& GB
Dr. Meral Binbasioglu, Professor ofIT/QM
Dr. Mohammed H. Tafti, Professor ofIT/QM
Dr. Na Wang, Assistant Professor ofBanking & Finance
Dr. Nancy A. White, Associate ProfessorofBanking & Finance
Dr. Nathan S. Slavin, Professor ofAccounting & Legal Studies
Dr. Ping Su, Asst. ProfessorofManagement, Entrepreneurship& GB
Dr. Rahul K. Bishnoi, Associate ProfessorofBanking & Finance
Dr. Ralph S. Polimeni, Professor ofAccounting & Legal Studies
Dr. Richard C. Jones, Associate ProfessorofAccounting & Legal Studies
Dr. Richard Hayes, Assoc. Professor ofManagement, Entrepreneurship& GB
Dr. Rick T. Wilson, Assistant ProfessorofMarketing & IB
Dr. Robert D. Campbell, Professor ofBanking & Finance
Dr. Robert Fonfeder, Professor ofAccounting & Legal Studies
Dr. Shawn T. Thelen, Associate ProfessorofMarketing & IB
Dr. Songpol Kulviwat, Associate Professorof Marketing & IB
Dr. Steven T. Petra, Associate Professor ofAccounting & Legal Studies

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2017

31

Journal of International Business and Law, Vol. 16, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 12

Dr. Wi S. Kim, ProfessorofBanking & Finance
Dr. William James, ProfessorofMarketing & IB
Dr. Yong Zhang, ProfessorofMarketing & IB
Eugene T. Maccarrone, J.D, Associate ProfessorofAccounting & Legal Studies
Martha S. Weisel J.D, Associate ProfessorofAccounting & Legal Studies
Robert Katz J.D, ProfessorofAccounting & Legal Studies
Steven B. Krull, Associate Professor ofBanking & Finance
Stuart L. Bass J.D, ProfessorofAccounting & Legal Studies
Susan L. Martin J.D, ProfessorofAccounting & Legal Studies
Victor Lopez J.D, Associate ProfessorofAccounting & Legal Studies

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/jibl/vol16/iss2/12

32

